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The Three "Switches" of Identity
Construction in Genocide: The Nazi Final
Solution and the Cambodian Killing Fields
Maureen S. Hiebert
Centre for Military and Strategic Studies & Department of Political
Science, University of Calgary
If we want to understand why political elites choose to commit genocide, we need to
inquire into how elite perpetrators reconstruct the collective identity of the victim
group such that genocide becomes the only possible policy option. This article
argues that elites decide to commit genocide, and not some other less catastrophic
policy of repression or violence, when three conceptual ‘‘switches’’ concerning the
identity, interests, and future actions of the victim group are ‘‘turned on’’ by the
perpetrators. First, members of the victim group lose their (often marginal) status
within the political community and are constructed as outsiders, to whom rights
and obligations are no longer owed. Next, they come to be seen as dangerous
enemies whose continued physical presence is seen to pose an overwhelming threat
to the political community. This second mortal-threat conception consists of three
mortal-threat ‘‘motifs’’: the struggle between the perpetrator and victims as an epic
battle; the victims as the controlling force behind, or controlled by, powerful
threatening external forces; and the victims as carriers of deadly biological
contagion. Finally, the victims are viewed as subhumans who can be killed without
compunction. The process of identity reconstruction as a whole is underpinned by a
pre-genocide history of exclusionary and authoritarian intergroup norms and
practices, and of authoritarian approaches to conflict management, and is
triggered by serious economic, political, or security crises.
Keywords: genocide, identity, constructivism, Holocaust, Cambodian genocide

Introduction
For genocide scholars, the overriding research question is, Why does something so
terrible as genocide happen (and continue to happen)? Given the enormous scope of the
question and the problems associated with grand theorizing in the social sciences,1 one
way to at least partially answer this larger question is to attempt to answer several
smaller ones: What are the underlying conditions that lead to genocide? Why are
certain groups identified as targets? Why do bystanders allow the killing to occur? Why
do the perpetrators do what they do? and so on. This article deals with another smaller
but central question: Why do political elites choose a policy of genocide instead of some
other less catastrophic and irrevocable policy?
As several genocide scholars have noted, the genocides of the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries have often been preceded by serious destabilizing security,
economic, or political crises with which the eventual victims of genocide come to be
negatively identified.2 If we want to know why genocide against a specific group or
groups becomes the policy option of political elites in the wake of crisis, we need to
think through carefully the way in which genocidal political elites and the dominant
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society reconceptualize the victim group’s identity, interests, and potential actions as a
response to crises. I argue here that elite conceptions of the victim group that
culminate in genocide go beyond identifying the victim group as being to blame for
specific crises (the scapegoat theory) or as a general threat to the future well-being of
the political community. If the collective identity-construction process stops at this
point, the policy response is likely to be anything from the arrest and repression of the
group’s cultural, political, or economic elite to restrictions on members’ economic,
political, or cultural activities. More seriously, elites may choose to use violence to
encourage flight or to terrorize the group into submission, or they may use large-scale
population-control measures such as physical segregation, internal deportation, or
expulsion, as well as retributive massacres. State-sponsored violence, terror, forced
population movements, and, of course, mass killing are, to be sure, often part of the
genocidal process itself. But in genocide they are specific policies designed to achieve
the larger policy goal of physically liquidating all or a part of the victim group; they are
not stand-alone policies believed by elites to be sufficient to counter the real and
perceived threats posed by a specific group.
The central claim being made here is that the reconstruction of the identity,
interests, and future actions of the victim group that leads to specifically genocidal
policies consists of a more precise formulation of the threat the victim group is believed
to pose. Fundamental to the reconceptualization process is the emergent belief that the
victim group imperils the dominant community through the mere fact of its continued
physical existence. Because the existence of the victim group is perceived to be the
ultimate source of the threat menacing the political community, the physical liquidation
of the victim group is understood by political elites (and accepted by the dominant
society) as the only way to protect society, truly and definitively, from a pernicious and
threatening ‘‘enemy within.’’ Without this specific reconceptualization process, the
response to crises would be other, less catastrophic forms of state violence, repression, or
conflict in which the victim group is stripped of real material power but not of the lives of
the members of the group.
To understand how political elites arrive at this specific reconceptualization of
the victim group, I begin by unpacking the mutually reinforcing and constitutive
relationship between structures and elite agency and then show how this relationship
influences the process by which elite political actors choose to initiate and execute
genocide. The article then examines what are called, in this study, the three
conceptual ‘‘switches’’ regarding the victim group—as foreigners, as mortal threats,
and as subhumans—that must be ‘‘turned on’’ in order for genocide to happen. The
final section provides a brief illustration of the argument with reference to two
relatively dissimilar cases of genocide: the Nazis’ Final Solution against the Jews of
Europe (a ‘‘racial’’/ethnic genocide) and the Cambodian genocide (a political/revolutionary genocide).3

Genocide as a ‘‘Rational Choice’’
On the face of it, genocide as a response to a crisis and a perceived threat to society is
not only evil but irrational. Reasonable human beings would rightly ask why the Nazis,
the Khmer Rouge, the Young Turks, or the Hutu Power regime chose to destroy
whole groups of people in response to real and perceived threats, to exterminate men,
women, and children simply because of who they were. It is an act that seems to rest
on entirely irrational prejudices, fears, and suspicions. But, as Helen Fein suggests,
genocide is, from the perspective of the perpetrators, an apparently ‘‘rational choice’’—a
6
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‘‘goal-oriented act [that] is rationally instrumental to their ends.’’4 Genocide is a rational
choice not because of the ideas or perceptions upon which it is based but because of the
decision-making process that leads to its perpetration.
In a recent example of an attempt to explain genocide as a rational, goal-oriented
strategic policy, Benjamin Valentino contends that elites commit genocide in order to
realize radical policy goals. In pursuit of these wider policy goals, perpetrator elites
employ exterminatory policies against a target group to force its members to do
something they would otherwise not do that is required for the realization of these
policies—for example, to submit to a radical new way of life, to give up their homes and
possessions, to cease supporting political and military opposition groups—or to counter
threats posed by a group. This decision, for Valentino, is made only when leaders have
concluded that other options for achieving their ends, including less violent forms of
repression or limited concessions to victim groups, are ineffective or impractical.5
Valentino further suggests that what he calls ‘‘ethnic mass killing’’6 takes place when
elites believe that the victims ‘‘pose a threat that can be countered only by physically
removing [them] from society.’’7
Leaving aside Valentino’s assertion that genocide is a means to a strategic end
rather than a policy goal in and of itself (a position that has been the subject of much
debate among genocide scholars for some time), his argument concerning conceptions
of threat and the decision to commit genocide is convincing, but it does not go far
enough. Neither the general perception of threat attributed to the victim group nor the
failure of less drastic policies directed at specific groups to realize other policy goals is,
on its own, enough to explain why genocide specifically is the policy response of radical
political elites, rather than other forms of violence and repression. We need to go
further and inquire into how elites construct the identities of their victims such that
genocide becomes the only policy option.
Another possible approach to explaining why and how political elites make the
rational but horrible choice to commit genocide is rational choice theory. As an
exclusively agency-oriented explanation of political behavior, rational choice theory
argues that actors choose between sets of goals; that goals are ‘‘ordered by purposive
actors’’; that the possible choices that actors might make are only those known to the
chooser; that actors try to choose the best means to their ends; that means themselves
are chosen through a process of calculating ‘‘subjective expected utility’’; and that
‘‘intentions can be inferred from behaviour.’’8 Significantly for the present study,
rational choice theory does not inquire into how actors arrive at their intentions or
goals. Rational choice theorist William H. Riker argues that linking intentions to
prevailing social norms or structures is an ‘‘unnecessary convolution that complicates
but does not eliminate the rational choice model,’’ because social norms ‘‘are
themselves creations of actors for some purpose,’’ elements that actors choose from
to frame their intentions and make their choices.9
Using a rational choice approach, we might argue that genocide (the observed
behavior of a state or comparable authority) is simply based on the intention to respond
to a crisis or set of crises and to meet a threat posed to the political community. But
without examining how genocidal elites arrive at this intention, and what precisely
underpins it, we have no way of knowing why genocide, and not some other, less horrific
form of repression or violence, is the response to crisis. All that rational choice theory
can tell us is that intentions are connected to goals and that purposive actors act to
achieve their goals, based on a set of expected utility calculations that genocidal elites
may follow in making the choice to commit genocide.10 Riker’s understanding of social
7
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norms or structures as simply the outcome of previous choices by actors misses the
possibility that agents’ actions consciously shape social norms and structures only part
of the time—that is, that actors do not stand apart from ideational or material structures
and simply pick and choose which elements of structure, such as norms, beliefs, and
practices, will influence their intentions and goals. Missing in rational choice
explanations is the mutually constitutive nature of structure and agency and, therefore,
the crucial ideational content that informs a choice to commit genocide as opposed to
some other act.
The missing content can be filled in by examining the interrelationship between
structure and agency—specifically, how the mutually constitutive relationship
between structure and agency affects how genocidal elites come to reconstruct the
interests, identity, and future actions of the victim group.

A Constructivist Explanation
As several genocide scholars have pointed out, modern genocides are motivated in part
by ideas. Robert Melson argues, for example, that revolutionary ideologies and the
revolutions they inspire call for the radical restructuring of society and the exclusion
of whole groups of people who are defined either as outside the new revolutionary order
or as fundamental threats to it.11 Similarly, Eric Weitz suggests that genocidal
ideologies are founded on modern exclusionary conceptions, such as nation, race, social
Darwinism, eugenics, hygiene, and imperialism, that have been combined in lethal
ways by genocidal elites to create ideologies that variously espouse the superiority
of specific races, the need for ethnically homogenous nation-states, the imperative
of protecting one’s own race from contamination by other races, and, in the case of
communism, the overthrow of exploitative economic systems and the socioeconomic
groups that dominate these systems.12 As Alex Alvarez also shows, such ideologies are
used by genocidal elites to manipulate state institutions and ordinary people alike to
target specific groups for elimination.13
Arguments that emphasize ideology are important, because they help identify why
genocidal regimes pinpoint certain groups as either superfluous or dangerous and in
need of removal from the new revolutionary order. But what ideology on its own cannot
explain is why genocide becomes the policy, rather than economic marginalization,
physical segregation, or expulsion. Weitz, for example, lays out in great detail the
origins of Nazi racist ideology but, in his treatment of the Holocaust, does not explain
why the same ideology singled out the Jews for complete extermination while the Poles
were slated for perpetual servitude. In short, the same ideology produced two
difference policy outcomes for two separate groups.
While acknowledging the importance of ideology in the overall genocidal process,
we need to examine the importance of ideas—particularly shared cultural and political
norms, beliefs, and historical practices—in a slightly different way if we want to
understand how it is that elites come to choose genocide as a policy option. Specifically,
we need to concentrate on how genocidal elites come to construct the identities of their
victims and how this identity construction is influence by pre-genocide norms, beliefs,
and practices. How elites construct the identities of groups in society determines
whether genocide or some other form of repression or violence becomes the policy of the
state. To be sure, the motivations to commit genocide for mid-level officials and frontline killers, although influenced by elite conceptions of the victim group and by the
same set of shared exclusionary norms and practices that inspire elite actors, are not
identical to those of senior decision makers. Christopher Browning’s research into the
8
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evolution of the Nazi Final Solution, for example, shows that ‘‘desk killers’’ of various
ranks were driven by a variety of imperatives, from bureaucratic infighting to career
advancement,14 while social psychologist James Waller argues that the ordinary
people who actually do the killing do so because of the all-too-human socialpsychological tendency to acquiesce to authority and the perceived requirements of
group solidarity, to allow killing to become routinized over time, and to see members of
out-groups as competitors or threats.15
Drawing on constructivist social theory, international relations theorist Alexander
Wendt argues, in his self-described meta-theory of collective identity construction, that
the subjective understanding of a group’s identity is influenced not only by formal
political and economic organizational arrangements, and by the material distribution
of power capabilities between collective actors, but also by knowledge and practices.16
Wendt suggests that material and ideational structures broadly construed, not just
political ideologies, shape conceptions of identities and interests, as well as behavior,
not only among members of one’s own group but with respect to other groups.
Collective identities are thus constructed and reconstructed according to collective
understandings of the ‘‘self ’’ and ‘‘other.’’ Meanwhile, conceptions of the ‘‘reality’’ of
intergroup relations are also socially constructed, such that new sets of mutual
understandings, expectations, knowledge, and perceived interests regarding different
groups can either change or solidify over time and thus, in turn, can change or solidify
certain intergroup relationships and actions.17
For Wendt, the structure of social consciousness—what he terms the ‘‘distribution
of ideas or knowledge’’—is shared among actors in the form of norms, rules, or
institutions. Social and ideational structures constitute identities and interests,
helping actors to, for example, find common solutions to problems, define expectations
of behavior, and identify what constitutes a threat.18 I argue here that in genocide, the
‘‘distribution of ideas’’ is composed of formalized rules and practices of exclusionary
and unequal group interaction, exclusionary norms concerning conceptions of the
community, and authoritarian methods of conflict management that exist prior to the
genocide. These pre-genocide practices, norms, and ideas, in turn, serve as the lens
through which the meaning of crises is interpreted, namely, as the responsibility of
the victim group, such that the victim group is believed to pose a general threat to the
political community in the future. Exclusionary practices and norms also function as
the material and ideational foundation upon which rests political elites’ further
reconstruction of the collective interests, identities, and behavioral expectations of the
victim group as a mortal threat to the continued survival of the race, revolution, or
nation.
As for how the ‘‘rational choice’’ to commit genocide is made, we must inquire into
how preferences are constituted, because, as Wendt tells us, ‘‘we want what we want
because of how we think about it.’’19 Motivations, desires, or interests should be seen
as ‘‘schemas,’’ ‘‘scripts,’’ ‘‘frames,’’ or ‘‘representations,’’ which are knowledge
structures that make possible ‘‘the identification of objects and events.’’20 How elites
think about a crisis and specific groups in society and how they come to reframe the
identity, interests, and future actions of the victim group are part of a pattern of
symbolic interaction in which collective actors relate to one another on the basis of the
meaning they have given to one another and to the specific acts they perform. These
meanings themselves stem from how the broader situation is understood, which, in
turn, is itself ‘‘embedded in culture.’’21 Actors revise their definitions of the situation as
they learn more about each other through continued social interaction. In situations in
9
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which power capabilities are uneven—as is clearly the case between the perpetrators
and the victims of genocide—‘‘social acts . . . tend to evolve in the direction favored by
the more powerful.’’22
Wendt argues that, like individual actors, collective actors engage in ‘‘perspective
taking’’ (i.e., cognitively standing in the others’ shoes) to further define each other’s
identity and interests. Through a process of shared interaction, Ego shapes a
conception of Alter that may or may not be objectively correct. Incorrect interpretations of the identity and interests of Alter are not, however, the result of incomplete
information about Alter or of misinterpretations of the ‘‘facts’’ about Alter, as rational
choice theory would suggest. Instead, emerging perceptions of Alter, no matter what
they are, are not passive perceptions of something that exists independent of Ego
but actively and over time constitutive of Alter’s role vis-à-vis Ego. Through her
representational practices Ego is saying to Alter, ‘‘you are an X, and I will act toward
you as if you were an X.’’ To that extent who Alter is, in this interaction, depends on who
Ego thinks Alter is . . . Role-identities are the meanings that actors attribute to
themselves when seeing themselves as an object, that is, from the perspective of the
Other. To that extent who Ego is, in this interaction, is not independent of who Ego
thinks Alter thinks Ego is . . . These self-understandings are in one sense inside Ego’s
own head, but they only become meaningful in virtue of Alter confirming them, which is
to say in virtue of social relations.23

Playing the role of Wendt’s ‘‘Ego,’’ genocidal political elites take the perspective of
‘‘Alter’’—that is, the victim group—such that the latter is believed to see in the state
and the dominant society a community that will be or is already covertly under the
group’s control, and/or a vulnerable society that can be exploited and ruined, to the
victim group’s advantage. Perpetrator elites, in effect, say to the victim group, ‘‘Your
continued existence is a mortal threat to our continued survival, and we expect you to
act as such a threat, and we will act toward you as if you were a mortal threat.’’ For
genocidal elites, the victim group’s identity is that of a mortal threat, because elites
think the group is a mortal threat.
This ‘‘perspective’’ is not, of course, the real perspective of the victim group but a
socially constructed one, based on perceptions rooted in pre-genocide exclusionary
norms and practices and in the interpretation of crisis. When political elites
contemplate genocide in the wake of crises, they do not, of course, begin a brandnew process of social interaction with the victim group. Rather, the process of symbolic
interaction through perspective taking is a continuation of the social interaction
between elites and the dominant society, on the one hand, and the eventual victim
group, on the other, that has been going on for years but is now pursued in a more
urgent and malevolent fashion.
The conceptual possibility of coming to see the victim group’s existence as a mortal
threat is grounded in widely held and entrenched pre-genocide norms and practices
marked by an unequal and exclusionary relationship between the victim group and
rest of society; in the tendency for groups in society to engage in informal sectarian
associational arrangements; in a conception of the political community that views the
victim group as outside or marginal to ‘‘true’’ or ‘‘authentic’’ membership in the
community; and in a state with a history of seeing societal conflicts—including those
involving the victim group—as serious threats to the stability of the state and society
that must be countered with repression, exclusion, and possibly force. Crises serve to
animate the worst existing conceptions of the victim group as well as to create an
extremist context in which political elites search for a way to understand the situation
10

The Three "Switches" of Identity Construction in Genocide

they are in, to bring the crisis or crises to a conclusion, and to prevent such crises in the
future.24 Turning to an already suspect group, elites engage in a renewed process of
interaction through perspective taking with the eventual victims of genocide. Drawing
on existing conceptions of the group and a recent history of disruptive crises, elites
read into the identity, interests, and future actions of the victim group a new and more
powerful threat to the community that can be solved only through deadly ‘‘final
solutions’’ to what are presented as perennial, and now urgent and deadly, ‘‘problems.’’
By comparison, in non-genocidal situations, either the response to crises includes no
reconceptualization of the identity and future behavior of groups in society, or the
reconceptualization process does not involve seeing the continued physical presence of a
specific group as an overwhelming threat. In the former situation, crises are
accompanied by a conceptualization process in which different groups within the
political community continue to be seen as full members of that community, with
commonly held rights and obligations vis-à-vis each other and the state and shared goals
for the future. Cooperation or, at least, accommodation in the face of internal or external
crises, whether economic, political, or military/security, is the result. The political
community, while in some instances still heterogeneous, is nonetheless conceived of by
elites and by members of society as a whole as one political community to which all
members of society still belong. Here the collective self is conceptualized as inclusive,
such that there is no other; a collective self thus confronts crisis as a unified whole.
Unlike genocidal situations, such cases are characterized by intersubjective understandings of society based on an existing political culture of tolerance and inclusiveness.
In instances where non-genocidal state violence, repression, or intergroup conflict is
the result of crises—for example, the Spanish Civil War—membership in the political
community may become contested at the same time that there is an absence of common
goals within the larger political community. The groups involved, whether they be
ethnically, religiously, linguistically, economically, or politically defined, see each other
as competitors for economic, political, military/security, territorial, or social goods in the
present and possibly even as threats to group gains in the future. While the important
element of threat and fear for the future also occurs in genocide, non-genocidal conflict
situations produce intergroup conflict because the threat posed by competing groups is
perceived to be mutual and is derived from actually existing power capabilities, not from
the mere fact of a group’s physical existence. Conflict between groups or state-sponsored
repression is pursued in order to weaken a competitor group, to acquire the group’s
capabilities, or to subordinate or even repress members of the group so that one’s own
group or the state may reap the benefits of having acquired the adversary’s power
capabilities (e.g., territory, economic and political power) for present and future gain
and protection.
Like cases of genocide, situations of mutual conflict are marked by a conceptualization of the collective self and other in which a relatively strict boundary is drawn
between the competing groups. Intergroup conflict is also frequently underpinned by
exclusionary and authoritarian norms and practices. But such situations differ from
genocide in that each group does objectively maintain some kind of real power
capability and that the contest itself is, for the most part, over real things and,
therefore, is not a purely constructed one.

Constructing Victims: The ‘‘Three Switches’’ of Genocide
The collective identity reconceptualization process that leads to genocide involves three
discernible yet often overlapping switches that must be turned on in order for genocide
11
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to occur. What sets this process apart from situations of mutual conflict and from the
exercise of non-genocidal state violence is the conceptualization of the victim group as a
powerful and dangerous ‘‘enemy within’’ whose overwhelming power is believed to
derive from their physical existence. The three switches are (1) the identification of the
victim group as outside or foreign to the political community; (2) the identification of
the victim group as an almost superhumanly powerful, dangerous ‘‘enemy within’’
whose continued existence threatens the very survival of the political community; and
(3) the paradoxical identification of the victim group as subhuman.
The first switch in the process revolves around the definition of who lies within and
outside the political community or what Helen Fein calls the universe of reciprocal
obligations.25 The function of this conceptualization is to delineate clearly to whom
political, economic, and social rights and obligations are owed, including citizenship,
constitutionally recognized political rights, socioeconomic support, and participation in
the economy. Those who are conceptualized to lie outside the political community are
deemed not to be entitled to such obligations and are, therefore, reconceptualized from
marginalized insiders to non-members or ‘‘foreigners.’’ A strict boundary is drawn
between ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them,’’ or the collective ‘‘self ’’ and the alien ‘‘other.’’ This boundary
is similar to that drawn between competitor groups in situations of intergroup conflict
but goes much further, in that membership in the political community is no longer
contested by competing groups, as is the case, for example, in civil wars. Rather, the
victim group is unilaterally stripped of membership, first conceptually and then
practically, by the state and the dominant society. No longer part of the community,
the victim group is effectively removed from society, and thus from protection by their
(former) fellow citizens against a hostile state.
The second switch in the genocidal conceptual process is the one that is entirely
unique to genocide. The now ‘‘foreign’’ victim group is further reconceptualized as a
powerful enemy bent on the destruction of the dominant group. Crucially, the source of
this power and threat is believed to reside, ultimately, with the physical presence of
the victim group. The continued existence of the victim group thus portends great
danger for the very survival of the wider community and produces, as Daniel Chirot
and Clark McCauley note, an intense ‘‘fear of extermination.’’26 The history and future
of the political community are reconstructed as an epic battle between a virtuous ‘‘us’’
and an alien, subversive, inherently threatening ‘‘enemy within.’’ Claims regarding
the supposed economic, political, or other manifestations of the victim group’s power
are regularly asserted, but the actual resources or power capabilities possessed by the
victim group are dwarfed by those held by the perpetrator state and the dominant
society. Objectively, the victim group does not pose a credible threat to the dominant
society. Because it is believed that the victim group derives its overwhelming power
from the members’ physical existence, and not from substantive power capabilities,
conflict, or repression—in which real power capabilities could potentially be removed
from a threatening group—is not enough; to neutralize the perceived threat posed by
the victim group, its members must be physically eliminated in order to rid the group
of the true source of its power. As psychologist Robert Jay Lifton concludes in his
study of Nazi doctors at Auschwitz, ‘‘where the threat is so absolute and so
ultimate. . . genocide becomes not only appropriate but an urgent necessity.’’27 Lifton
continues, ‘‘thus perceived as an absolute threat to the continuous life of one’s own
people, the victim group is seen as the bearer of death and therefore the embodiment of
evil. More than merely nonhuman or heathen, it is dangerously anti-man and antiGod. Its disease takes the form of infecting others with death taint and deadly
12
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weakness . . . Only genocide, total elimination of the disease will protect one from that
weakness.’’ Because the victim group ‘‘threatens one’s own people with extinction . . . one must absolutely extinguish him first.’’28
More specifically, the second-switch conception of the victim group is grounded in,
and expressed as, three mortal-threat ‘‘motifs’’ in which the very survival of the
political community is perceived by political elites to be at stake. The first motif is that
of ‘‘epic struggle,’’ in which elite perpetrators believe that they are engaged in a battle
to the death—a ‘‘race war’’ or ‘‘class conflict,’’ for example—with their victims. Victory
requires the physical liquidation of the threatening victim group, whose own victory is
thought to result in the destruction of the race, nation, or revolution. The second threat
motif is that of pernicious foreign ideological or national influence or invasion. For
some perpetrators, this conception involves linking the extermination of the victim
group with the need to save the political community from threatening external actors
who are believed to be under the victim group’s control. For other perpetrators,
‘‘internal enemies’’ are targeted because of their supposed links to expansionist or
powerful external actors. Finally, the third threat motif is expressed as a disease
metaphor. According to this perception, the victims must be physically eliminated
because their continued existence is believed to expose the perpetrators and the wider
society to lethal contagions. Perceived as ‘‘microbes,’’ ‘‘bacteria,’’ or ‘‘cancer,’’ members
of the victim group are to be killed through violent processes of ‘‘purification,’’
‘‘cleansing,’’ and the surgical ‘‘cutting out’’ of diseased parts.
The dehumanization of the foreigner-cum-dangerous-enemy-within is the final
switch of the genocidal reconceptualization process. This conceptualization of the
victim group is not the motivation for genocide, as much of the existing genocide
literature suggests, but, instead, provides an understanding of the victim group that is
necessary in order for the actual extermination to take place. The dehumanization of
the victim group is not enough to lead to genocide, because to see members of a
particular group as subhuman is not to impute to them the capacity or the power to
constitute an overwhelming mortal threat. The Nazis, for example, regarded Poles and
other Slavs as Untermenschen, as less-than-human beings to be repressed and
transformed into slave laborers for the Third Reich and the new German East. Here
only the third switch was turned on. Jews, on the other hand, were regarded as mortal
threats who, because of the very fact of their existence, had to be exterminated.
Victims of genocide are nonetheless dehumanized by being equated with
‘‘animals,’’ ‘‘vermin,’’ or ‘‘pests,’’ so that the actual act of exterminating whole groups
of people becomes intellectually comprehensible and psychologically tolerable for
perpetrators and bystanders alike. Whereas the mortal-threat conceptualization (the
second switch) provides the motivation and rationale for genocide, dehumanizing the
victim group makes the actual genocide psychologically palatable and, therefore,
makes its perpetration possible. As Herbert Kelman argues, dehumanization in a
genocidal context is one of the processes by which the ‘‘usual moral inhibitions against
violence become weakened.’’ Such an understanding of the target group creates a
situation in which ‘‘moral principles no longer apply to the victim,’’ thus facilitating
smooth and efficient killing, as moral restrictions are more easily overcome.29

The Nazis’ Final Solution and the Cambodian Killing Fields
What follows is a necessarily brief analysis of the three switches with reference to the
Final Solution and the Cambodian Killing Fields. Rather than a chronological
narrative of each genocide or a detailed examination of the available historical
13
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evidence regarding exactly when and how the decision to commit genocide was
made, the discussion will focus on a few key illustrations of how elite perpetrators
reconceptualized the identity of their victims in such a way that they came to consider
genocide the only acceptable policy option.

The First Switch
The first conceptual switch for Germany’s Jews was turned on by Adolf Hitler and his
victorious National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) shortly after they came
to power in January 1933. Central to the Nazi conception of German Jews at this time
was the idea that Jews were inherently foreign and that a strict boundary must be
drawn between the alien, corrupting ‘‘Jew’’ and the German, or ‘‘Aryan,’’ majority.
Hitler saw conceptually and practically stripping German Jews of their ‘‘Germanness’’
as key to achieving the völkisch ideal of a strong, homogeneous, and united Germany
free of destructive Jewish influence. Looking back on the first years of Nazi leadership,
Hitler made plain this conception of German Jews, urging in his closing speech at the
Nuremberg Parteitag on 12 September 1938 that the removal of German Jews from all
facets of German society must continue, ‘‘because National Socialism desires to
establish a true community of the people . . . Because we are National Socialists we can
never suffer an alien race which has nothing to do with us to claim the leadership of
our working people.’’30 More than a year earlier, Hitler similarly argued, in a speech
before the Reichstag on 30 January 1937, that ‘‘we refuse to permit an alien race any
influence upon our political, spiritual, or cultural life or to allow an alien any
privileged position in the economic sphere.’’31
Throughout the 1930s, the Nazi regime implemented measures that successively
stripped Jews of their legal and economic rights as well as their place within German
culture and society. But it was the enactment of the Reich Citizenship Laws of
15 September 1935 that drew the most explicit line between Jews and Germans,
unilaterally stripping Jews of their legal status as citizens and thereby definitively
removing them, legally and conceptually, from the German political community.
Paragraph 2 established the criterion for full citizenship: ‘‘a Reich citizen is a subject
of the State who is of German or related blood’’; ‘‘the Reich citizen is sole bearer
of full political rights in accordance with the Law.’’32 In the First Decree to the
Reich Citizenship Law, 14 November 1935, paragraph 4 explicitly disenfranchised
Jews: ‘‘A Jew cannot be a Reich citizen. He has no voting right in political matters.’’
Departing from Judaism’s definition of Jewishness as based on matrilineal descent and
embracing instead a racial definition, the decree defined a Jew as ‘‘a person descended
from at least three Jewish grandparents who are full Jews by race.’’33
The legal and, more importantly, conceptual framing of the identity of Jews as
separate from German and other national identities was not lost on at least some Jews
at the time. Reading newspaper reports of the promulgation of the Nuremberg Laws
from his vantage point in Vienna, the highly secularized and assimilated future deathcamp survivor Jean Amery (then named Hans Mayer) was immediately struck by the
new separate racial identity conferred on him by the Nazi regime. Amery wrote after
the war that he ‘‘needed only to skim them and already I could perceive that they
applied to me. Society, concretized in the National representatives of the German
people, had just made me formally and beyond any question a Jew.’’34 Amery writes
that as the Holocaust unfolded he experienced, prior to his deportation and even later
in Auschwitz, ‘‘the social reality of the wall of rejection that arose before us
everywhere.’’35
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Summing up the Nazi regime’s steady removal of Jews from German society in the
1930s, Holocaust historian Saul Friedlander suggests that the Nazis doggedly
overcame the challenge of separating out a previously assimilated minority:
Among the main obstacles faced by the regime in its attempt to eliminate the Jews from
Germany was the fact that the victims had been part and parcel of every field of activity
in German society. In consequence, if direct violence was not [yet] possible, the system
had to elaborate ever new administrative or legal measures in order to undo, stage by
stage, step by step, the existing ties between society and the Jews.36

With the turn toward deportation and concentration during the first years of the war,
the Nazi leadership still kept the first conceptual switch on concerning the collective
identity of the Jews—even as it moved closer and closer to turning on the second
conceptual switch, which would lead from 1941 onward to the annihilation of
European Jewry. In the summer of 1941, for example, Joseph Goebbels emphasized
the necessity of maintaining the unequal legal and conceptual status of the Jews
through their continued removal from Nazi Germany. In a bid to head off criticism of
the requirement that German Jews wear the Judenstern (the yellow star), Goebbels, as
propaganda minister and Gauleiter of Berlin, argued forcefully that ‘‘the Jews had no
right to claim equality with us’’ because ‘‘they are Jews who have no right to a voice in
the community.’’37
In the case of Cambodia, the first-switch dynamic differs in a number of respects
from the reconceptualization of German Jews as foreign or alien to German society.
The Khmer Rouge period in Cambodia involved the first-switch reconceptualization of
not one but several different groups of people at different times for the duration of
Khmer Rouge rule. As well, the first-switch conceptualization of the victim groups in
Cambodia occurred virtually simultaneously with the second conceptual switch, which
further defined these same groups as not only alien to the revolution but also
inherently threatening and dangerous. Further, while the victims of the Khmer Rouge
were targeted for destruction by means both direct (execution) and indirect
(malnutrition, lack of medical care, abuse, etc.), the act of physical separation of the
victims did not occur as it did in the Holocaust.
The first-switch reconceptualization of the identity of the various victim groups
as outside revolutionary Cambodian society revolved around the Khmer Rouge’s
own particularly rigid Marxist understanding of Cambodian society as historically
and presently divided into antagonistic classes. In the quest for a homogeneous,
united, ‘‘collective’’ revolutionary community, classes, ethnic groups, and, eventually,
individual cadres and their associates and families deemed suspect were to be
overcome and, as Alex Hinton argues, ‘‘excluded from the revolutionary community of
equals.’’38
Using personal histories to categorize Cambodians into revolutionary and
reactionary classes served to conceptually and practically divide the society of
Democratic Kampuchea into three distinct and separate groups, each with differing
levels of membership, or non-membership, in the new revolutionary community.
The ‘‘new people,’’ mostly urbanites from what were labeled Classes I and II, were nonmembers of revolutionary Cambodia. A 1978 party publication identified the poor
peasants as the foundation of the revolution and therefore deserving of the designation
‘‘full rights members,’’ while ‘‘reactionaries,’’ whose status varied according to the
degree to which they were perceived to be naturally hostile to the revolution, were
further broken down into three sub-groups: ‘‘those who can be drawn to the
revolution’’; ‘‘neutralists, who do not oppose the revolution’’; and, in language that
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clearly demonstrates the third-switch conception of the victim group as non-human,
‘‘the savage ones who cannot be reeducated.’’ All leadership cadres were instructed to
‘‘select and assign by dividing into separate categories full rights, probationary and
depositee members,’’ with the latter understood to be the ‘‘new people’’ deported
from the cities. The purpose of this exercise was to ‘‘clearly distinguish the good from
the bad.’’39
Just as the Nazis maintained an essentialist understanding of Jews as a ‘‘race’’
that could never be German, the Khmer Rouge made plain its similarly rigid
conception of the counterrevolutionary identity of the ‘‘new people’’ and other suspect
groups. Members of suspect classes were defined by, and could not overcome, their
counterrevolutionary identity. The previous possession of property was said, in a 1976
special issue of the party publication Tung Pradevat (‘‘Revolutionary Flags’’), to
‘‘obstruct the understanding and the absorption of the Socialist Revolution. No matter
how we explain it, the struggle cannot break it out.’’40 Even though these classes had
been defeated with the advent of Democratic Kampuchea, ‘‘their specific traits and
contradictions (tamna) still exist . . . in consciousness, in standpoint,’’ and, more
threateningly, in ‘‘class rage.’’ Capitalists, feudal landlords, and petit-bourgeois
intellectuals, therefore, still maintained the ‘‘essence of class.’’ This essence was ‘‘the
class standpoint, class character (nissay), sentiments, [and] habits’’ that ‘‘remind[ed] it
of the desire to oppress.’’ The article concludes by reinforcing the static nature of
counter revolutionary class identity, suggesting that, quite simply, ‘‘[a] number of
them [vea, literally ‘‘things’’] cannot be corrected,’’ since they ‘‘continuously seek
occasions to oppose the revolution.’’41

The Second Switch
The Epic-Battle Motif
At the heart of much of Nazi ideology were the belief that the world is divided into
superior and degenerate races, the need to protect the purity of a people’s ‘‘blood,’’ and
the idea of race wars. This belief applied particularly to the perceived epic struggle
between Jews and Aryans. In Mein Kampf, Hitler argued that ‘‘the mightiest
counterpart to the Aryan is represented by the Jew.’’42 Behind this assertion is a more
general understanding that ‘‘history itself represents the progression of a people’s
struggle for survival,’’ in which ‘‘life is a never ending battle against death.’’43 If a
successful struggle for the preservation of the blood and culture of the German people
is not waged against the Jews,
then the Jews can move in, in every form, and this master of international poison
concoction and racial debasement will not rest until he has completely uprooted and
thereby corrupted such a people. The end, then, is the loss of a certain uniform racial
value and thus the final decay . . . every existing racial value of a people [will become]
ineffective—if not downright endangered.’’44

Drawing on these foundational ideas, both Hitler and those of his subordinates
most closely involved in the decision, taken in mid-1941, to exterminate Europe’s Jews
began to describe the Jews as mortal enemies who must be destroyed if the Reich and
the German people were to be saved. In a leading article titled ‘‘The Jews are Guilty!’’
published in the Nazi journal Das Reich on 16 November 1941, Goebbels invoked the
epic struggle motif, proclaiming that ‘‘the Jews are receiving a penalty that is certainly
hard, but more than deserved . . . and is now gradually experiencing the destruction it
planned for us, and would have carried out without a second thought if it had
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possessed the ability.’’45 ‘‘Every Jew is our enemy in this historic struggle,’’ he warned
his readers, whether those Jews lived in the ghettos of Europe or on Wall Street: ‘‘All
Jews by virtue of their birth and their race are part of an international conspiracy
against National Socialist Germany. They want defeat and annihilation, and do all in
their power to bring it about.’’46
In 1942 and 1943, once the genocide was underway, Hitler himself repeatedly
referred to his ‘‘prophecy,’’ articulated in what has come to be known as his ‘‘threat
speech’’ of 30 January 1939, in which he forecast the destruction of European Jewry
should the Jews ‘‘succeed’’ in plunging Europe once again into war. But in restating his
prophecy, Hitler noticeably changed its language to directly connect the Jews not with
starting a new European-wide war that would lead to the ‘‘Bolshevization’’ of Europe,
as Hitler had originally warned in January 1939,47 but with the destruction of the
‘‘Aryan race.’’ Thus, on the ninth anniversary of the Nazi seizure of power, Hitler
proclaimed, in his address at the Berlin Sportpalast on 30 January 1942,
that the war can only end either with the extermination of the Aryan peoples or the
disappearance of Jewry from Europe . . . [Th]at this [war] will not come to an end as the
Jews imagine, with the extermination of the European-Aryan peoples, but that the result
of this war will be the annihilation (Vernichtung) of Jewry. For the first time the old
Jewish law will now be applied: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth . . . And the hour will
come when the most evil world-enemy of all time will have played out its role, at least for
a thousand years.48

Like Hitler and Goebbels, Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler similarly argued, in
an infamous speech before an assembly of SS officers in Posen in October 1943, the
dangers of leaving any Jews alive in Germany and, by extension, in Europe. Seeking to
assure his men that their role in the extermination program was a just and noble
cause, Himmler stressed that the SS ‘‘had the moral right, we had the duty toward our
people, to destroy the people that wanted to destroy us.’’49
In the Cambodian case, the epic-struggle motif revolved not around race (apart
from the Vietnamese) but around the conception of an unending lethal struggle
between antagonistic classes. Building and protecting the revolution involved a
constant battle to confront inevitable class contradictions and the hidden class
‘‘enemies within’’ they produced—enemies whose goal it was to destroy Democratic
Kampuchea, the Communist Party, and the revolution.
Senior Khmer Rouge leaders believed that the recent history of the party was that
of a ‘‘party led by the working class’’ steeped in ‘‘the contradictions in Kampuchean
society,’’ as ‘‘Brother Number Two,’’ Nuon Chea, told a Communist Party delegation
from Denmark in July 1978. In pre-revolutionary times, the party fought ‘‘external
contradictions’’ between the Cambodian nation and ‘‘US imperialism’’ while simultaneously battling ‘‘internal contradictions . . . between, on the one hand the working
class and the capitalists and on the other the poor peasants and the feudal class.’’50
Among the ‘‘new people’’—or ‘‘new peasants,’’ as the article ‘‘Sharpen the
Consciousness’’ calls them—there still existed ‘‘life and death contradictions.’’51
Making explicit reference to the enduring nature of class struggle between
revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces and, therefore, the continuous threat of
internal class enemies to the revolution, a Communist Party document from 3–7 June
1976 notes that while the revolution had defeated many enemies, there will still be
many more in the future: ‘‘the enemy will carry out activities against us, against our
revolution, in various forms. This is the continuous non-stop struggle between
revolution and counter-revolution.’’ The document then projects this as a permanent
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state of affairs: ‘‘there will be enemies in ten years, twenty years, thirty years into the
future . . . the struggle between revolution and counter-revolution will continue.’’
Noting that not all but some contradictions are created by enemies, the document
concludes that ‘‘we cannot escape them.’’52 While the party conceded that ‘‘it is possible
that some compositions [i.e., classes] can correct themselves . . . many cannot.’’ Even ‘‘if
these people die,’’ the revolution will not be safe, since ‘‘they will have instructed their
children to keep struggling against communists.’’53
The enduring nature of the threat posed by ongoing class contradictions was
further reinforced in a party study session in 1976, during which the participants were
told that the party
must remain vigilant against internal class enemies because our socialist revolutionary
direction is an uncompromising, bitter, life-and-death combat between classes, both
indirect and most thorough, between the property-less class under the leadership
of the Party and the life-and-death enemy who comprises the various exploiting
classes . . . which hide themselves in our revolutionary ranks, in the army, and in the
ranks of our Party.54

The Foreign-Threat Motif
The mortal threat posed by Jews as the ultimate leaders of rapacious Bolshevism
further solidified the conception of Jews as an all-powerful, inherently dangerous,
threatening, and foreign force. Illogically, the Jews were also conceptualized as international capitalists who covertly controlled the Western Allies, secretly pushing Great
Britain and the United States to fight another war with Germany. But it was the
threat of ‘‘Jewish Bolshevism,’’ which surfaced repeatedly in Nazi discourse from the
1920s onward, that contributed to the perception that Jews were a threat like no other,
since Nazism and Bolshevism were seen as two competing Weltanschauungen.
In his original ‘‘threat speech’’ at the Reichstag on 30 January 1939, Hitler
emphasized the Jews’ dangerous capacity for the devious manipulation of international capital and Western governments, to the point of being capable of starting a new
world war that, in Hitler’s view, would lead, rather nonsensically and paradoxically, to
the ‘‘Bolshevization’’ of the world. This overwhelming power and threat posed by the
Jews, would, however, be defeated in the most thorough way possible:
If the international Jewish financiers in and outside Europe should succeed in plunging
the nations once more into world war, then the result will not be the bolshevization of
the earth, and thus the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation of the Jewish race in
Europe!55

The link between Jews and the threat posed by Soviet Bolshevism was drawn
even tighter with the launching of Operation Barbarossa (the invasion of the Soviet
Union) and the advent of the genocidal Einsatzgruppen and Sonderkommandos,
tasked first with the shooting to death of ‘‘commissars’’ and ‘‘Jewish men’’—the
latter described as the ‘‘intellectual reservoir of Bolshevism’’ by SD chief Reinhardt
Heydrich. At a meeting at the headquarters of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (the
Reich’s main security office, or RSHA) on 17 June 1941, Heydrich told the assembled
Einsatzgruppen, Einsatzkommandos, Sonderkommandos, and other top police officers
that ‘‘this reservoir must be destroyed.’’56 For Goebbels, meanwhile, the war was the
product of an unholy alliance between ‘‘Bolshevik Jews’’ in Moscow and the ‘‘Jewish
plutocrats’’ in London and Washington.57
During the latter years of the war Goebbels justified the war of extermination in
the East, against so-called Jewish Bolshevism, and the Final Solution by explicitly
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tying the survival of the Third Reich to the destruction of the Jews. Goebbels peddled
his own particular version of the world Jewish conspiracy theory by arguing that the
Allies menacing the Reich from both west and east were operating under the control of
world Jewry, bent on the extermination of the German people:
They organized the enemy’s war economy and encourage plans to exterminate and
destroy the Axis powers. England and the USA recruit from among them bloodthirsty
and vengeful agitators and political lunatics and they are the source of the terror
commissars of the GPU [the Soviet secret police].58

Near the end of the war, Goebbels went even further, accusing Soviet and Western
Allied soldiers of being mercenaries of the Jews.59
Like the Nazis, the Khmer Rouge leadership perceived the revolution to be in
mortal danger, heightened by the foreign-threat motif; in this case, however,
Democratic Kampuchea’s many hidden enemies were believed to be stalking horses
for foreign influence and invasion whom the party considered, as one document put it,
‘‘running dog agents burrowing within ourselves,’’ ‘‘international agents,’’ or simply
‘‘enemy agents.’’60
A radio broadcast on 10 May 1978 named Vietnam and its internal agents
explicitly as a mortally threatening enemy that must be neutralized in order to
save the ‘‘Cambodian race.’’ After calling for the ‘‘purification’’ (a common euphemism,
at the time, for mass killing) of the armed forces, the Communist Party, and the
masses, the broadcast went on to state that the struggle against internal and external
Vietnamese-inspired enemies was vital ‘‘in order to continue fighting the enemies in
defense of Cambodian territory and the Cambodian race, for if we do not do so, our
race will disappear. Do we want to see the end of the Cambodian race? If we do not to
defend our territory, we shall lose it, and then our race will also disappear.’’ Should
the Vietnamese invade, the broadcast predicted, ‘‘we shall lose our territory and our
race will be completely swallowed up.’’61
In a Khmer Rouge document titled ‘‘The Last Plan,’’ parts of the ‘‘evidence’’62
gathered by the party refined the supposed role of Vietnam and those purportedly
working covertly for Vietnam inside DK and the party. The Vietnamese communists in
Hanoi were said to be the ‘‘implementers’’ of a plot to take over the country and destroy
the party. Inside Cambodia, secret ‘‘CIA agents’’ and ‘‘Vietnamese expansionists’’
allegedly cooperated to implement this ‘‘scheme in constant contact with the
outside.’’63 Until the plan was ‘‘uncovered,’’ cadres involved in its implementation
had worked for years to create internal divisions in order to weaken all parts of the
party. The ultimate goal of the ‘‘men who were hiding inside’’ was to ‘‘join hands to
smash all sides thus winning the power forever, particularly definitely abolishing
communism.’’64
According to the Khmer Rouge, Democratic Kampuchea’s alleged enemies were not
all doing the bidding of the Vietnamese. In his confession-through-torture before
execution, senior moderate cadre Hu Nim ‘‘confessed’’ to being recruited as a CIA
member to conduct subversive activities within the party as early as 1957. His task
was ‘‘to bring outsiders inside the Communist Party of Kampuchea in order to destroy
it from within’’ and ‘‘to change the line of the [party] . . . and the revolutionary
movement’’ toward ‘‘revisionism,’’ because ‘‘revisionism is the way toward capitalism
anyway.’’65
Without discussing when it would have happened or under what circumstances,
Nuon Chea suggested in 1978 that some cadres had been imprisoned by the offending
foreign powers and, like the Manchurian Candidate, tortured and turned into enemy
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agents who were unwittingly accepted back into the party—but ‘‘we now realized they
had become agents of the enemy.’’ Although a ‘‘plot’’ by the United States to take over
DK Cambodia with the help of the Vietnamese and the KGB six months after
liberation was apparently foiled, Nuon Chea asserted that the Khmer Rouge must
‘‘apprehend the people who have infiltrated our party. We know the current plan
involves not only Vietnamese agents, but has something to do with US imperialism
and the KGB. All of them!’’66
The Biological-Contagion Motif
The final mortal-threat conception, the motif of biological contagion, identified Jews as
a deadly, opportunistic infectious agent that threatened the purity of German blood
and society with disease and death. The future health and strength of the Aryan or
Nordic race could be ensured only through the destruction of what threatened it most:
the Jews.
From the early 1920s onward, Hitler’s public discourse about the Jews was riddled
with references to the Jews as a ‘‘plague’’ and ‘‘a harmful bacillus.’’67 Mein Kampf
likens the Jews to
the typical parasite, a sponger who like a noxious bacillus keeps spreading as soon as a
favorable medium invites him [in]. And the effect of his existence is also like that of
spongers: wherever he appears, the host people dies out after a shorter or longer
period.68

Other Nazi leaders evinced the same perception of Jews as a lethal contagion. Just
after the invasion of Poland, Goebbels is reported to have commented to his officials
that he believed the Jews ‘‘represented an international infection, and that it will fight
against the state of order until it controls them.’’ During the ‘‘abnormal times in the life
of a nation at war,’’ Goebbels was ‘‘convinced that we cannot allow Jewry, as a seat of
infection, to exist any longer.’’ He argued that there ‘‘can be no more discussion in
Germany of the necessity of removing Jewry as a seat of infection. The vast majority of
the German nation want a total solution to the Jewish question.’’69
For the Nazi leadership, therefore, the Jews were a deadly pestilence that had to
be physically removed from the European body politic. Goebbels thus invoked the
specter of deadly disease and the metaphorical medical procedures required for dealing
effectively with the threat posed by the Jews: ‘‘Our task here is surgical . . . drastic
incisions or some day Europe will perish of the Jewish disease.’’70 On 23 July 1941,
Hitler similarly referred to the Jews, in a conversation with Croatian Marshal
Kvaternik, as ‘‘a centre of pestilence for humanity.’’ Without giving any details, Hitler
assured Kvaternik that all Jews were going to be removed from Europe and warned
that any state that retained Jews would invariably become a new source of infection
and decomposition.71
For the Khmer Rouge, the motif of biological contagion was invoked repeatedly as
the revolution’s internal enemies were labeled ‘‘microbes’’ or sources of contamination
or poison, ‘‘burrowing within the revolution’’ to destroy it from the inside out.
One Communist Party report called for ‘‘continuous measures’’ to be taken so that
‘‘enemies will not be able to advance, using venom and poison.’’72 Using almost
identical language, a 1977 Central Committee document emphasizes that ‘‘[b]y
screening traitorous elements and bad elements, the party enjoys relief from [the]
pain and abscess [and] venom’’ caused by internal party enemies.73 Switching to a
related hygiene metaphor, cadres were reminded at a study session in 1976 to
remain vigilant against enemies but were told that the party had already taken
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effective measures: ‘‘We have been scrubbed clean [another euphemism for mass
murder] and nurtured in political standpoint, consciousness, and organization.’’74
The most explicit formulation of the victims-as-disease threat motif was
articulated by Pol Pot in the threatening end of his 1977 ‘‘microbes’’ speech, which,
in effect, signaled the genocidal intraparty purge to come:
While we are engaged in a socialist revolution, there is a sickness inside the Party, born
in the time when we waged a people’s and a democratic revolution. We cannot locate it
precisely. The illness must emerge to be examined. Because the heat of the people’s
revolution and the democratic revolution were insufficient at the level of the people’s
struggle and at the level of class struggle among all layers of the national democratic
revolution, we search for the microbes within the Party without success. They are
buried.75

Echoing Goebbels’ reference to surgical cuts to eliminate poisonous European
Jewry, the Khmer Rouge, according to one survivor,
justified destruction of ‘‘diseased elements’’ of the old society. . . . We were told
repeatedly that in order to save the country, it was essential to destroy all contaminated
parts. . . . It was essential to cut deep, even to destroy a few good people rather than
chance one ‘‘diseased’’ person escaping eradication.76

The conception of the enemy as an unseen but ever-present disease infecting the
party and the revolution contributed greatly to the constructed nature of the victims of
the Cambodian genocide. Since the enemy was unseen but present, it could take
almost any form, even appearing to be loyal to the cause or of proper class background,
yet be on the inside a source of counter-revolutionary contagion. The fluid nature of the
construction of the victims’ collective identity led the genocide—at first inflicted on
elements of the old regime, on ethnic minorities, and on clearly defined class enemies
such as the ‘‘new people’’—to turn inward and become a genocidal internal party
purge.

The Third Switch
Holocaust survivors have noted that low-level perpetrators in the ghettos and the
camps saw Jews not as human but as animals, or even less than that.77 The public
dehumanization of Jews began soon after the Nazis came to power. Boasting of the
alleged success of the boycott of local Jewish businesses, a participant at a conference
for German civil servants told his audience that Jews should not be surprised by the
boycott, since ‘‘when you, Jew, regard us as a beast, do not expect us to treat you like a
human being.’’78 Heydrich, a central figure in the planning and perpetration of the
genocide until his assassination in 1942, characterized Jews to his fellow SS officers
in January 1939 as ‘‘the eternal subhumans.’’79 In a tour of newly occupied Poland in
September 1939, Himmler, Heydrich’s superior, later recounted to other SS officers
how he had summoned a few of the ‘‘criminal specimens’’ to show colleagues traveling
with him a sick elderly Jewish man’s bone structure, calling the old man, and all
Ostjuden (eastern Jews), ‘‘vermin.’’80 After a similar junket to the Lodz ghetto in the
General Government, Goebbels reportedly told Hitler of his visit: ‘‘It’s indescribable.
Those are no longer human beings. They are animals.’’81 The following year Himmler
told an audience in Krakow that ‘‘anti-Semitism is exactly the same as delousing.
Getting rid of lice is not a question of ideology. It is a matter of cleanliness.’’82
The advent of the death camps and the industrialized killing of Jews in gas
chambers was, in part, a means of relieving the psychological burden on the low-level
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perpetrators of killing their victims face to face. But the death camps also served as
a means by which the victims could be completely dehumanized before their deaths,
making their killing by gassing, medical experimentation, starvation, abuse, or disease
a psychologically acceptable task.83 For some death-camp commanders, the dehumanization of Jewish prisoners through humiliation was necessary in order for the
low-level perpetrators to operate the industrial machinery of death. When asked by
a post-war interviewer, ‘‘If they were going to kill them anyway what was the point of
all the humiliation, why all the cruelty?’’ the Kommandant of Treblinka, Franz Stangl,
replied, ‘‘To condition those who actually had to carry out the policies. To make it
possible for them to do what they did.’’84 In a statement that seems to reveal that
Stangl’s approach worked on at least some frontline perpetrators, Order Policeman
Alois Hafele, a guard at the Chelmno death camp, told a superior in 1943 that he had
become used to the killing: ‘‘Little men or little women, it was all the same, just like
stepping on a beetle.’’ As Hafele spoke, he reportedly made a scraping motion with his
foot on the floor.85
The victims in the camps were also keenly aware of their own dehumanization.
In his painful recollections of the Muselmänner86 who haunted his memories years
after his liberation from Auschwitz, Primo Levi describes the completely dehumanized
state in which these ‘‘drowned’’ men existed:
Their life is short, but their number is endless; they, the Muselmänner, the drowned,
form the backbone of the camp, an anonymous mass, continually renewed and always
identical, of non-men who march and labour in silence, the divine spark dead within
them, already too empty to really suffer. One hesitates to call them living: one hesitates
to call their death death, in the face of which they have no fear, as they are too tired to
understand.87

In Cambodia the refrain ‘‘to keep you is no gain, to kill you is no loss,’’ constantly
repeated by the Khmer Rouge to the regime’s victims, clearly indicated the degree to
which individual human life had become devalued and easy to extinguish. In his
analysis of the orientation Khmer Rouge cadres adopted toward the urban populations
of Phnom Penh and other cities, David Chandler suggests that the dehumanization of
the ‘‘new people’’ was almost immediate. The rural cadres who took over and emptied
the cities saw urban dwellers as ‘‘enemies,’’ to be ‘‘treated as they deserved. Overnight
they became ‘new people’ or ‘April 17 people’—less than human, without privileges or
rights.’’88
In everyday discourse, the victims of the Khmer Rouge were addressed by the
dehumanizing vulgar noun vea (‘‘it’’ or ‘‘thing,’’ normally used for inanimate objects
and for animals). Ethnic minority victims of the genocide were similarly addressed; the
Vietnamese were frequently referred to by the pejorative yuon (‘‘savage’’). Such modes
of discourse dehumanized those deemed to be non-members of the revolution and, as
Hinton argues, helped legitimize—and, one could add, facilitate—violence against the
victims.89
The dehumanization of victims in the service of death in Cambodia reached its
nadir at the Tuol Sleng torture and execution facility, located in a former high school in
Phnom Penh. Articulating the party leadership’s conception of their enemies as
subhuman, former senior party cadre Hu Nim was tortured into proclaiming, in his
extracted confession, ‘‘I am not a human being. I am an animal.’’90 Recalling the
appallingly brutal torture he and other inmates endured at Tuol Sleng, survivor Vann
Nath said in an interview after the genocide that the prisoners were treated as if they
were ‘‘worth less than an animal to them . . . They didn’t treat us like people.’’91
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The ability to treat perceived enemies as subhuman was learned early by
many Khmer Rouge cadres, even before the victory in 1975. Many of these cadres
were recruited at a very young age from the nomadic hill tribes of the remote northeastern provinces of Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri, where isolated Khmer Rouge camps
were located during the latter Sihanouk years at the beginning of the civil war. By
exploiting these impoverished, illiterate youths’ resentment of prosperous city dwellers
and the fact that they had no stake in the pre-revolutionary system, the Khmer Rouge
leadership, as Karl Jackson suggests, ‘‘sought out those from the bottom rung of
society—those who were so envious of persons with more wealth that they would
willingly strike them down.’’92 The teenage cadres were taken from their families,
treated brutally by their superiors, and then given what the Communist Party said
was the great honor of becoming Oppakar Phdach Kar Robas Pak, literally ‘‘the
dictatorial instrument of the Party.’’
In this element of the third switch, then, we see a contrast with the Nazi final
solution. In Cambodia, both dehumanizing discourse and the dehumanization of the
perpetrators facilitated killing through execution, abuse, and neglect of the regime’s
victims. In the Nazi case, the explicitly dehumanizing discourse directed at the Jewish
victims was also present, while the projection of the dehumanized state of the low-level
perpetrators onto the victims was not. In fact, the SS, which bore the primary
responsibility for executing the genocide on the ground, was billed by Himmler as an
elite corps of the most racially pure Aryans in the Reich, the ‘‘hardest of the hard men,’’
who had been given the bloody but noble task of riding the Reich and Europe of the
subhuman Jewish race.

Conclusion
The preceding discussion of the importance of collective identity reconstruction and elite
decision making can help us to fill in a piece of the larger ‘‘why genocide’’ puzzle raised at
the beginning of this essay in three ways. First, it focuses our analysis on a small but key
group of actors in the genocidal process, without whom genocide would not be possible. It
is, after all, these elite actors who make the decision to commit genocide. In order to
understand why elite perpetrators choose genocide as a policy option, we need to go
beyond considering general precursors, triggers, and general conceptions of blame,
threat, and dehumanization attached to the victim group. To complete the picture, we
need to account for how elite perpetrators conceptualize the identity of the victim group
such that genocide comes to be seen as the only possible policy response.
Second, an emphasis on collective identity construction is useful because it also
allows us to further explore the answer to the ‘‘smaller’’ questions noted above. The
relationship between structure (both ideational and material) and collective identity
reconstruction by elite and societal actors (the latter of which is not examined here but
is of central importance) points to the significance of the precursors to genocide and
how they directly influence the genocidal decision-making process. As is outlined only
briefly in this article, pre-genocide norms and practices that include unequal and
exclusionary relationships between the eventual victim group and the rest of society,
exclusionary conceptions of who constitutes the genuine membership of the political
community, and authoritarian and sometimes violent methods of conflict management
by the state directly influence how, in the wake of crises, elite actors reconceptualize
(and how the dominant society comes to accept) the identity of the victim group as a
mortal threat and why specific groups are targeted for genocide while others are not.
As for the perpetrators and why they do what they do, identifying the three conceptual
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switches of genocide allows us to differentiate the motivation for genocide—the second
mortal-threat conception of the victim group that leads elite perpetrators to chose a
policy of genocide—from the dehumanization of the victim group that allows both elite
and frontline perpetrators to actually carry out the extermination of objectively
innocent and powerless human beings.
Finally, the case-study comparison suggests that the collective identity
reconceptualization process that underpins the decision to commit genocide is
common across relatively dissimilar cases and that, therefore, this process is likely
common to most genocides in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The model
offered here is not a predictive social-science theory. Rather, it tries to offer some
insight into mutually constitutive relationship between ideational structures (norms)
and material structures (practices and crises), on the one hand, and the genocidal
process of reconceptualizing the victim group, on the other, as the foundation for elite
decision making. The emphasis, then, is on a set of general structures and processes
that get at the underlying logic of genocide and thus can tell us, albeit only partly, why
something so terrible as genocide happens.
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